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Corporate Officers Beware-Your Signature
on a Negotiable Instrument
May Be Hazardous to Your Economic Health
TOM L. HOLLAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
Numerous business transactions are conducted each day by cor-
porations. These business transactions are handled by corporate
officers and employees. Many of the transactions require the use of
negotiable instruments,1 primarily checks2 and promissory notes.' In
almost all of the transactions involving the use of a negotiable in-
strument, the parties intend that the corporation will be liable on
the instrument. Occasionally, the parties also intend that one or
more corporate officers will be liable on the instrument.
To hold a corporation liable on an instrument, the signature of
the corporation must appear on the instrument.' Corporate
signatures are made by corporate officers who are authorized to
sign negotiable instruments for their corporation.' When a corporate
signature is properly made by authorized corporate officers, the cor-
poration will be liable on the instrument.'
Without a proper corporate signature, a court may hold a cor-
porate officer personally liable although one or more of the parties
to the transaction intended only corporate liability. The Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) contains a set of rules to be used for
determining the circumstances under which a corporate officer will
be personally liable on a negotiable instrument. Section 3-403 of the
U.C.C. provides in part:
(2) An authorized representative who signs his own name to an
instrument
*Acting Dean and Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law;
B.A., 1961, Friends University; J.D., 1970, The University of Tulsa; LL.M., 1976,
University of Illinois.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Harold Brown, J.D. 1979, and
Lillian Hamor, Class of 1981, for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
'A negotiable instrument is a writing signed by the maker or drawer, containing
an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum certain in money, which must be
payable on demand or at a definite time and which must be payable to order or to
bearer. U.C.C. § 3-104(1).
'A check is a draft drawn on a bank which is payable on demand. U.C.C. §
3-104(2)(b).
3A note is a promise other than a certificate of deposit. U.C.C. § 3-104(2)(d).
'See U.C.C. § 3-401(1).
5See id. § 3-403(1).
'See id. §§ 3-401(1), 3-403(1).
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(a) is personally obligated if the instrument neither names
the person represented nor shows that the represen-
tative signed in a representative capacity;
(b) except as otherwise established between the immediate
parties, is personally obligated if the instrument names
the person represented but does not show that the
representative signed in a representative capacity, or if
the instrument does not name the person represented
but does show that the representative signed in a
representative capacity.
(3) Except as otherwise established the name of an organi-
zation preceded or followed by the name and office of an
authorized individual is a signature made in a representative
capacity.
This Article will focus on the personal liability of corporate
officers rather than corporate liability. The provisions of section
3-403 will be analyzed to determine when the signatures of author-
ized corporate officers may result in personal liability and when
parol evidence may be admitted to deny personal liability. The cor-
porate officer who fails to sign properly bears the burden of disprov-
ing personal liability, and the admission of parol evidence is often
crucial to meeting this burden. Additional theories for holding the
corporate officer personally liable, such as lack of authority7 and
estoppel,' are beyond the scope of this Article.
II. CORPORATION NOT NAMED-
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY NOT SHOWN
The corporate officer who signs a negotiable instrument that
neither names the corporation nor shows representative capacity is
personally liable under subsection 3-403(2)(a) and cannot introduce
parol evidence to deny this liability. This subsection makes no
distinction between the situation where personal liability of the cor-
porate officer is being asserted by the payee of the instrument and
the situation where personal liability is being asserted by a
transferee of the instrument.
The rule of subsection 3-403(2)(a) is justified when a transferee
seeks to hold the corporate officer to personal liability on the
instrument. When the transferee took the instrument, the face of
the instrument gave no indication that it was the obligation of any
person other than the corporate officer whose signature appeared on
the instrument. Requiring the transferee to go behind the face of
7See id. § 3-404(1).
'See id. § 3-404(1), Comment 4.
[Vol. 13:893
CORPORATE SIGNA TURE
the instrument and perform an investigation to determine whether
the instrument was a corporate obligation would place an
unreasonable burden on the transferee, thus seriously impairing the
negotiability of all instruments containing only individual
signatures. Consequently, no cases have been found where a cor-
porate officer has sought to avoid personal liability against a
transferee when the instrument neither named the corporation nor
showed that the corporate officer signed in a representative
capacity.
When the rule of subsection 3-403(2)(a) is applied to impose per-
sonal liability on a corporate officer in favor of the payee of the
instrument, however, the rule cannot be justified on the basis of an
unreasonable investigative burden. The payee, unlike the transferee,
is a party to the original agreement. When the payee and the
authorized corporate officer agree that the instrument is only a cor-
porate obligation, the payee is aware of the liability of the corpora-
tion without further investigation.
On the other hand, holding corporate officers individually liable
to payees may be supported on the ground that corporate officers
should realize that their unqualified signatures on an instrument
indicate personal liability. Thus corporate officers who give an in-
strument to satisfy an obligation of the corporation without intend-
ing to incur personal liability should make sure that the corporation
is named as a party to the instrument and that their representative
capacity is designated. Using that justification for the rule, the rule
then takes on the characteristics of a statute of frauds, prohibiting
the corporate officer from establishing by parol evidence an obliga-
tion different from that shown on the face of the instrument.
A. The Admission of
Parol Evidence Between
Immediate Parties
Similarity to a statute of frauds cannot justify a strict applica-
tion of subsection 3-403(2)(a) to every instrument failing to show the
corporate name and representative capacity. In some actions
brought by a payee, corporate officers should be permitted to use
parol evidence to avoid personal liability. The payee, as an
immediate party to the transaction, cannot take free of defenses.' If
the payee transfers the instrument, however, the transferee takes
free of almost all defenses." Consequently, allowing the corporate
officer to avoid personal liability against the payee will not impair
9See id § 3-305(2).
'1d
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the negotiability of the instrument because the corporate officer will
remain liable to a transferee.
First Bank & Trust Co. v. Post" presented a situation justifying
the admission of parol evidence to avoid personal liability. The cor-
porate note in Post had been signed by the individual defendants as
makers, and the same individual defendants had made guaranty in-
dorsements on the back of the note. The defendant corporation
became bankrupt, and the plaintiff bank sought to recover against
the individual defendants in their capacity as the makers of the note
because they could not be held liable as guarantors.2 The name of
the corporation did not appear on the note, and the individual
defendants did not indicate their representative capacity. The note,
however, was signed in connection with a security agreement which
did name the corporation immediately above the signatures of the
individual defendants.
The signatures of the individual defendants as both makers and
guarantors of the note and their signatures on the security agree-
ment in conjunction with the name of the corporation created an am-
biguity. The individual defendants and the bank officer who had
negotiated the loan testified that only a corporate obligation had
been intended, and the bank officer testified that his omission of the
corporate name from the face of the note was an oversight. Every
notation on the face of the note, except the signatures of the in-
dividual defendants, had been written by the bank officer, thereby
supporting the bank officer's testimony that he was responsible for
failing to include the name of the corporation. The Post court
reasoned:
The uncontradicted testimony of all parties to this instru-
ment indicates that the note was understood and intended to
be a corporate obligation and that due only to some over-
sight on the part of the plaintiff the form of the instrument
signed did not reflect that understanding. The Uniform
Commercial Code . . . was never intended to be used by
courts to create a result that is contrary to the clearly
understood intentions of the original parties. 3
"10 Ill. App. 3d 127, 293 N.E.2d 907 (1973).
'"The individual defendants, in their capacity as indorsers, were discharged from
liability as guarantors because the bank had impaired the collateral by failing to
perfect the security interest. Id. at 132, 293 N.E.2d at 910-11.
"Id. at 131, 293 N.E.2d at 910.
[Vol. 13:893
CORPORATE SIGNA TURE
Another case presenting facts warranting the admission of parol
evidence is Weather-Rite, Inc. v. Southdale Pro-Bow4 Inc." "South-
dale Pro-Bowl, Inc." had been typed on the first signature line of the
note. On the second line was the signature of John Dorek followed
by the designation "President." The signature of Frank Beutel ap-
peared on the third signature line without designation. The note had
been indorsed by both John Dorek and Frank Beutel. The signature
of John Dorek in the indorsement contained the designation "Presi-
dent," but the signature of Beutel was again undesignated. The
plaintiff payee brought an action against Beutel, alleging that Beutel
was personally liable as indorser although conceding that he had
signed as maker in a representative capacity. Plaintiff objected to
the admission of parol evidence on the grounds that Beutel's in-
dorsement neither named the corporation nor showed represen-
tative capacity. If the plaintiff had been a transferee, the Supreme
Court of Minnesota would have disallowed parol evidence. Explain-
ing that the indorsement was "ambiguous when viewed in its com-
plete context.""5 the court quoted from an amicus curiae brief of the
Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code.
'In the present case, the form of the note itself raises doubt.
If the payee wanted the individual liability of the two of-
ficers of Southdale, why did it accept the indorsement: "John
H. Dorek, Pres."? On the other hand, if Buetel thought he
was signing only as an officer of Southdale, why did he not
add to his signatures something to show he was vice presi-
dent? Anyone looking at the present note will have at least
some shadow of doubt cross his mind, and since the plaintiff
is the payee, all of the parties should be allowed to tell their
stories. There is a factual question which should be resolved
by a jury, or a judge sitting without a jury.' e
Dorek's indorsement in his representative capacity created a
possibility that the parties had understood that Beutel was also
signing in a representative capacity.17 Thus the court permitted
parol evidence to establish that Buetel had indorsed the note only in
his capacity as an officer of the corporation.8
"301 Minn. 346, 222 N.W.2d 789 (1974).
"Id. at 349, 222 N.W.2d at 791.
"Id. at 349 n.2, 222 N.W.2d at 791 n.2.
"Id. at 350, 222 N.W.2d at 791.
14The court distinguished on the facts a similar case, Central Trust Co. v. J. Got-
termeier Dev. Co. See note 37 infra and accompanying text.
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Parol evidence was also admitted in A.L. Jackson Chevrolet, Inc.
v. Oxley,19 although no corporate name nor representative capacity
appeared on the instrument. Jackson Chevrolet commenced an
action to recover for the sales of merchandise and parts. Invoices
showed that the sales had been made to "Guymon Motor Sales"
rather than "Guymon Motor Sales, Inc.," the proper name of the cor-
poration. Bill Oxley, the president of Guymon Motor Sales, Inc., had
paid for these purchases with checks which were returned because
of insufficient funds. Oxley had signed these checks, but had failed
to name the corporate entity or indicate his representative capacity.
The corporate account number was shown on the checks, but the
Oklahoma Supreme Court reasoned that the account number was in-
sufficient to name the corporation. ° Thus, the situation appeared to
fall under subsection 3-403(2)(a).
The court applied, however, a misquoted version of subsection
3-403(2)(b)"' and was willing to permit parol evidence between the im-
mediate parties although neither the corporation nor the represen-
tative capacity was indicated." Oxley failed to produce evidence suf-
ficient to establish an agreement of corporate liability or any other
defense; consequently, the court held Oxley personally obligated on
the checks.
Although the opinion leaves some question about which subsec-
tion of 3-403 was applied in reaching the decision, the court arrived
at the correct result. Assuming that the court decided the case
under subsection 3-403(2)(a), the court did not base its decision on a
blind adherence to the rule stated in that subsection. The court per-
mitted Oxley to use parol evidence to establish that he was not per-
sonally obligated on the instrument.24 Merely asserting an intention
to sign as a corporate officer, however, is not sufficient to avoid per-
sonal liability." Oxley had the burden of establishing an understand-
ing between himself and Jackson Chevrolet that he was not to be
personally obligated on the checks. 6 His evidence failed to satisfy
this burden. 7
9564 P.2d 633 (Okla. 1977).
"Id. at 636.
"In discussing the application of § 3-403, the court cited § 3-403(2)(b), but used the
language of § 3-403(2)(a). The court added "except as otherwise established between
the immediate parties," language which is not included in § 3-403(2)(a).
n564 P.2d at 635-36.
"Id. at 636.
"Id. at 634-35.
"Id. at 635.
"Id. at 635-36.
"Id. at 636.
[Vol. 13:893
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Although the Post, Weather-Rite, and Oxley courts refused to
apply a strict rule against parol evidence, many courts continue to
follow subsection 3-403(2)(a) blindly. An illustration is the case of
United Burner Service, Inc. v. George Peters & Sons, Inc.28 A note
was signed by corporate officers Eleanora L. Walter and Carrie A.
Peters without disclosing representative capacity or the name of the
corporation. The note was given for an obligation of the corporation.
Defendant Peters alleged that the note had been signed only in a
representative capacity. The New York Supreme Court summarily
denied the admission of parol evidence to establish corporate liability,
stating that the corporate officers would have no defense on the note
"even assuming that plaintiff knew the individual defendants signed in
a representative capacity."'
The inflexibility of the United Burner decision may produce harsh
results. As the Oxley,0 Weather-Rite, and Post courts decided, parol
evidence between immediate parties may be justified. Parol evidence
certainly should be admitted when all parties to the agreement testify
that only a corporate obligation was intended, as in the Post opinion.
Parol evidence is justified when the form of the note raises doubt
about the obligation of a party, the situation in Weather-Rite. Per-
mitting parol evidence against a plaintiff payee also appears fair
when the instrument includes at least some indication of the cor-
poration, such as the corporate account number in Oxley, from
which to infer that the payee had been made aware of the corpora-
tion and had agreed to hold only it liable. Furthermore, in any case
where a corporate officer denies personal liability in an action
brought by the payee, the courts should seek some justification for
refusing to permit parol evidence and for imposing personal liability
on the corporate officer other than a strict adherence to the rule set
out in subsection 3-403(2)(a).
B. Justifications For Refusing Parol Evidence
In Bostwick Banking Co. v. Arnold,"1 corporate officers signed a
promissory note without any indication of representative capacity or
the identity of the alleged corporate principal. At trial, the officers
sought to introduce evidence that the payee bank knew that they
were signing only as agents of the corporation and that the bank
had agreed to insert "Sunshine Ford Sales Corporation, By:"on the
note above the signatures of the corporate officers. The plaintiff
115 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968).
"Id. at 384.
"Misquoting the U.C.C., however, detracts from the credibility of the Oxley rule;
thus, its precedential value is uncertain. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
"227 Ga. 18, 178 S.E.2d 890 (1970).
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bank claimed that personal liability had been intended and denied
that it had agreed to insert the corporate name above the
signatures of the officers. The Georgia Supreme Court observed
that the note lacked any space above the signatures of the corporate
officers for the alleged insertion and that no corporate borrowing
resolution had authorized this transaction. 2 The court also stated
that the corporate officers could easily have written in the name of
the corporation before signing the instrument if a corporate obliga-
tion had been intended.3" Based on these factors, the court refused
to permit parol evidence to support the claims of the officers. 4 The
face of the note presented a substantial basis for refusing parol
evidence, but it should be noted that the court relied in part on
parol evidence-absence of a corporate borrowing resolution-to
deny the corporate officers the chance to establish their claim by
parol evidence.
Similarly, in Barden & Robeson Corp. v. Ferrusi,5 the defend-
ants claimed that they had sent a letter with the note stating that
they had signed only as officers of the Garfield Development Co.
The plaintiff claimed that it did not receive the letter and that it
took the personal note of the officers in lieu of filing a mechanic's
lien on property owned by Garfield. The New York Supreme Court
refused to permit parol evidence to defeat personal liability on the
part of the corporate officers.3" This decision can be supported by
logic: why would defendants send a letter stating that they were not
personally liable rather than merely signing the note in a manner
that clearly indicated corporate liability? The court, however, relied
on subsection 3-403(2)(a), rather than logic, to refuse parol evidence.
The use of parol evidence was denied in the New York case of
Central Trust Co. v. J. Gottermeier Development Co. 7 The maker of
the note wasthe corporation; the corporate signature had been proper-
ly made by John B. Gottermeier as president. He had also indorsed the
note under a printed guaranty agreement without indicating his
representative capacity or naming the corporation. He claimed that the
note had been indorsed only in a representative capacity. The court's
refusal of parol evidence 38 was justified because personal liability is the
only reasonable explanation for Gottermeier's indorsement 9 The
"Id at 21-22, 178 S.E.2d at 893.
91d.
"Id at 22-23, 178 S.E.2d at 893-94.
3152 A.D.2d 1061, 384 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1976).
"Id. at 1062, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 597-98.
"65 Misc. 2d 676, 319 N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
"Id. at 677-78, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 26-27.
"AGFA Gevaert, Inc. v. Bueding, 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 794 (Md. D. Ct. 1972).
[Vol. 13:893
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court, however, did not rely on this reasonable explanation but relied
instead on subsection 3-403(2)(a) to prohibit parol evidence.
In Coleman v. Heiple,4 corporate officers had signed without
showing representative capacity on notes lacking the corporate
name. The corporate officers were the sole shareholders of the cor-
poration. The notes, stating "we promise to pay," had been given to
secure obligations of the corporation, but the credit had been ex-
tended on terms more favorable than the terms previously granted
to the corporation. Moreover, the notes had been given to induce
the creditor to continue supplying goods on credit to the corpora-
tion. The Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas refused to permit
parol evidence to contradict the notes on the ground that the lack of
corporate name and representative capacity established individual
liability as a matter of law under subsection 3-403(2)(a).4 The court's
decision could have been justified if based on the language, "we prom-
ise to pay," but would have been bolstered by reliance on the parol
evidence concerning the extension of credit to the corporate officers
on more favorable terms to secure obligations of the corporation and
to induce continued credit extensions to the corporation. The court's
decision may have been influenced by this parol evidence.
In Kaminsky v. Van Dusen,4 the note had been written on a per-
sonalized check form. The name of the bank and the account number
had been crossed out, but the printed name of William R. Van Dusen
and Betty Van Dusen had remained at the top of the form. The Van
Dusens claimed to be only guarantors for Van Dusen Roofing Co.,
but they had not named the corporation on the instrument. The Van
Dusens had also failed to show their representative capacity. Parol
evidence was denied by the court relying on subsection 3-403(2)(a).3
The court's decision could have been justified on the basis that leav-
ing the printed individual names while striking the bank name and
account number showed that the Van Dusens intended to be per-
sonally liable on the instrument.
In the cases previously discussed, some basis other than a blind
adherence to the rule stated in subsection 3-403(2)(a) was available to
the court for imposing personal liability on the corporate officers. In
each of the cases except Bostwick Banking Co. v. Arnold, however,
the court failed to rely on the other available grounds, electing to
support its decision solely on subsection 3-403(2)(a).
4018 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 445 (Pa. C.P. 1975).
"Id. at 447-48.
88 Misc. 2d 833, 390 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
"I& at 834, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 545.
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Subsection 3-403(2)(a), strictly applied, imposes personal liability
on corporate officers by precluding the use of parol evidence to
avoid personal liability. Although a few courts have permitted parol
evidence between immediate parties, the majority of the courts that
have decided cases under subsection 3-403(2)(a) have strictly followed
its provisions. Moreover, the Bostwick court relied in part on parol
evidence to preclude the use of parol evidence by corporate officers,
and parol evidence may have influenced the Coleman v. Heiple
court's decision to prohibit parol evidence by corporate officers. The
use of some parol evidence to form the basis for refusing other parol
evidence cannot be justified.
When applying the rule in subsection 3-403(2)(a), the courts
should not follow the inflexible approach taken in the majority of
the cases. Instead, when a corporate officer denies personal liability
in an action between the immediate parties, the court should permit
parol evidence unless some reasonable basis exists for refusing to
permit parol evidence and for imposing personal liability on the
officer. When a court decides to permit parol evidence, the burden
of proving that personal liability was not intended should be placed
on the corporate officer, as the Oxley opinion instructs." Some may
argue that the trier of fact will favor the corporate officer over the
creditor payee if parol evidence is permitted, but that risk is prefer-
rable to erroneously imposing liability on the corporate officer.
Adherence to the rule against parol evidence set out in subsection
3-403(2)(a) can be justified only in situations involving a transferee or
a reasonable basis for refusing parol evidence in an action between
immediate parties.
III. QUESTIONABLE WHETHER CORPORATION
NAMED- REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY NOT SHOWN
If an instrument names the corporation, the corporate officer
may present parol evidence against the plaintiff payee to show cor-
porate liability under subsection 3-403(2)(b). The defendant in
Southern Oxygen Supply Co. v. de Golian,4 however, unsuccessfully
argued that the corporation was named. The opinion implied that
the action was between the immediate parties to the instrument."
The note had been signed by the defendant de Golian on the lower
right corner where the printed word "signatures" appeared. On the
left side of the note in a space specified for an address, the name
and address of "Golian Steel Co." appeared. The defendant claimed
11564 P.2d at 635-36.
45230 Ga. 405, 197 S.E.2d 374 (1973).
"Mid. at 406, 197 S.E.2d at 375.
[Vol. 13:893
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that he had signed only as president of "Golian Steel and Iron Co."
The Georgia Supreme Court held that showing the name of b cor-
poration similar to the name of the corporation claimed to be the
principal obligor on the instrument was insufficient to constitute the
naming of a person represented. 7 Thus, according to the court,
subsection 3-403(2)(a) was the proper rule to determine liability in
this case. 8 The court strictly applied the rule to impose personal
liability on the defendant and reversed the decision of the Georgia
Court of Appeals permitting parol evidence under subsection
3-403(2)(b).4 9
If the plaintiff in de Golian had been a transferee of the instru-
ment, imposing personal liability on the defendant would have been
reasonable. The instrument did not appear to be a corporate obliga-
tion because of the location of the corporate name on the instru-
ment." The names of obligors on promissory notes generally are
shown in the lower right corner, not in the lower left corner." A
transferee could have logically concluded that the corporate name
was shown merely to indicate the mailing address of the individual
signer. De Golian was an action between immediate parties,
however, and the uncertainty that would have been present for a
transferee was not present for the plaintiff payee who had been a
party to the original transaction. Moreover, a slight discrepancy in
the corporate name should not be sufficient grounds for ruling that
the corporation had not been named. Therefore, the Georgia
Supreme Court should have ruled that the corporation was named
and should have permitted the defendant to use parol evidence
under subsection 3-403(2)(b) to avoid personal liability by showing
that the parties had agreed that the individual defendant was not
personally liable on the instrument. The burden of proof that per-
sonal liability was not intended, however, should be placed on the
defendant.52
American Exchange Bank v. Cessna,5" illustrates a proper denial
of parol evidence against a transferee. The defendant Cessna had
signed a check without indicating his representative capacity. The
name "Cessna Ranch" appeared on the check in the lower left corner
'sId.
5 The corporate name was printed in the lower left corner of the instrument as
opposed to the lower right corner. Id
"The court in de Golian noted that a court could take a judicial notice of this fact.
Id (citing Bostwick Banking Co. v. Arnold, 227 Ga. 18, 22, 178 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1970)).
'A.L. Jackson Chevrolet, Inc. v. Oxley, 564 P.2d 633, 635-36 (Okla. 1977). See in-
fra notes 81-110.
386 F. Supp. 494 (N.D. Okla. 1974).
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with an address and a telephone number. Cessna Ranch was a
California corporation, and the defendant claimed that he had signed
as either president or general manager of the corporation.
Arguably, the words "Cessna Ranch" were sufficient to name
the person represented. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma did not decide whether the corpora-
tion was adequately named because the plaintiff was a transferee,
not an immediate party. Consequently, under subsection 3-403(2)(b),
parol evidence was not admissible to show that defendant had signed
only as an officer of the corporation and was not personally liable on
the instrument."
The decision in Cessna is correct. Requiring the transferee to in-
vestigate whether Cessna Ranch was a corporate entity and
whether the defendant was to be personally liable on the instrument
would have placed an unreasonable burden on the transferee and
seriously impaired the negotiability of the instrument.
IV. INSTRUMENT SHOWS CORPORATE
NAME -REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY NOT SHOWN
Subsection 3-403(2)(b) applies to instruments which show either
the corporate name or the representative capacity of the corporate
officer. The vast majority of cases which fall under this subsection
involve an instrument showing the corporate name but not the
representative capacity.55 Consequently, the following discussion will
"Id. at 496.
"Research has revealed two cases in which the representative capacity but not
the corporate identity was shown. In Giacalone v. Bernstein, 348 So.2d 679 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1977), the word "by" preceded the signature of the individual defendant. The
court refused to consider the use of the word "by" sufficient to show representative
capacity and precluded the use of extrinsic evidence in an action between immediate
parties. The use of "by" should have been adequate to allow parol evidence under
subsection 3-403(2)(b). Representative capacity was also shown in National Bank of
Georgia v. Ament, 127 Ga. App. 838, 195 S.E.2d 202 (1973). "R. & A. Concrete" had
been handwritten on the first signature line of the face of the promissory note. On a
second signature line appeared the following signature, "By: Grover Roberts." "Grover
Roberts" had been typed under his signature, partially covering a third signature line.
On the reverse side, the defendant had indorsed the note "X John Ament Sec. &
Tres." The corporate name had not been included with Ament's indorsement on the
back of the note. The trial court dismissed the action against Ament, ruling that he
was not personally liable because of the qualified signature. The Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that Ament's signature had not been clearly made in a
representative capacity; Ament might have signed on the back after deciding the face
of the note lacked sufficient space for his signature. His signature, however, may have
been intended to indicate personal liability. This conclusion is correct. Subsection
3-403(2)(b) permits the use of parol evidence to establish personal liability of a cor-
porate officer even though the officer indicated representative capacity with his
signature.
[Vol. 13:893
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be limited to this recurring situation. Subsection 3-403(2)(b) sets out
two separate rules for determining the liability of the corporate
officer, depending upon whether the party seeking to establish
liability is an immediate party to the instrument or a transferee. If
the plaintiff is an immediate party, the defendant may introduce
parol evidence to avoid personal liability, but if the plaintiff is a
transferee, parol evidence is precluded under a strict interpretation
of this subsection.
56
A. Immediate Parties
Subsection 3-403(2)(b) authorizes the use of parol evidence be-
tween immediate parties. Parol evidence is most often used by cor-
porate officers to avoid personal liability, but is occasionally used by
payees to establish personal liability. If parol evidence is used to
avoid personal liability, the defendant has the burden of proving
that the parties intended only corporate liability. 7
1. Parol Evidence to Avoid Personal Liability.-North Carolina
Equipment Co. v. DeBruh15 is illustrative of the admissibility of
parol evidence to avoid personal liability. The first signature line of
the note in DeBruhl contained the name "LaFayette Transportation
Service." The signature of "James L. DeBruhl" followed on the
second signature line without any indication of DeBruhl's status as
an officer of the corporation. The North Carolina Court of Appeals
properly permitted the introduction of parol evidence to establish
that DeBruhl had signed only in his capacity as president of the cor-
poration. 9 The court explained: "When the plaintiff who sues the
agent personally is one who dealt directly with the agent, and the
signature either names the principal or indicates the representative
capacity, section 3-403(2)(b) permits the agent to introduce parol
evidence of his agency status to avoid personal liability." 0
Instruments often contain language implying that the corpora-
tion and the officer are jointly liable. The decisions are less uniform
in admitting parol evidence when the instrument uses joint liability
language. Rosedale State Bank & Trust Co. v. Stringer"1 and Wood
"See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-5 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].
57See, notes 81-100 infra & accompanying text.
"28 N.C. App. 330, 220 S.E.2d 867 (1976); accord, Sullivan County Wholesalers,
Inc. v. Sullivan County Dorms, 59 A.D.2d 628, 398 N.Y.S.2d 180 (1977); Medley Har-
woods, Inc. v. Novy, 346 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
"128 N.C. App. at 333, 220 S.E.2d at 869.
"Id (citing J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-5, at 406 (Ist ed. 1972)).
612 Kan. App. 2d 331, 579 P.2d 158 (1978).
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Press, Inc. v. Eisen" allowed parol evidence despite language of
joint liability.
The note in Stringer had been preprinted with the words "the
undersigned jointly and severally promise to pay." It had been sign-
ed as follows:
MAY PLASTICS, INC.
By: /s/William D. Jobe Secretary
William D. Jobe
/s/William D. Jobe
William D. Jobe
Is/George L. Stringer
George L. Stringer 3
The payee of the note brought an action against Stringer, the presi-
dent of the corporation. The trial court excluded evidence showing
the bank had agreed that Stringer was signing only as a corporate
officer." Reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals of Kansas
held that the parol evidence concerning the understanding of the
parties should have been admitted." The appellate court did not
view the words "the undersigned jointly and severally promise to
pay" as precluding Stringer from introducing parol evidence because
these words were applicable to William D. Jobe who "unques-
tionably signed the promissory note in both a representative and in-
dividual capacity.""6
The Eisen decision involved a series of notes, each stating "we
promise to pay" and containing the stamped words "Home Fashions
Guild" followed by the signature of the defendant Eisen who was
president of Home Fashions Guild, Inc. An officer of the plaintiff
payee testified that Eisen had promised to be personally liable on
the note. Finding Eisen personally liable, the lower court relied
strongly on a prior case brought by a holder in due course rather
than by a payee as in Eisen.7 On appeal, the New Jersey Superior
Court remanded the case to the lower court with instructions to
weigh the conflicting parol evidence despite the language indicating
joint liability.
"'157 N.J. Super. 57, 384 A.2d 538 (1978).
"2 Kan. App. 2d at 334, 579 P.2d at 161.
"Id at 331-32, 579 P.2d at 161.
"Id. at 339, 579 P.2d at 164.
UidL
67157 N.J. Super. 57, 62, 384 A.2d 538, 540 (1978) (relying on O.P. Ganjo, Inc. v.
Tri-Urban Realty Co., 108 N.J. Super. 517, 261 A.2d 722 (Law Div. 1969), holding the
corporate officer liable as a matter of law).
U157 N.J. Super. at 62-63, 384 A.2d at 541.
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Contrary to Stringer and Eisen, the Georgia Court of Appeals in
Colonial Film & Equipment Co. v. MacMillan Professional
Magazines, Inc.,69 relied on joint liability language to deny parol
evidence. The defendant officer in Colonial Film claimed that he had
signed the nineteen promissory notes only as president of the cor-
poration. Each note stated "[w]e promise to pay" and the waiver
clause applied to "each of us." The signature block, located in the
lower right corner of each note, appeared as follows:
Given under the hand and seal of each party
Colonial Films [typewritten] L.S.
Taylor Hoynes, Jr. [handwritten] L.S.0
The defendant argued that the lower court should have allowed
parol evidence to establish that he had not agreed to be personally
liable. The Georgia Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's exclu-
sion of parol evidence and ruled that Hoynes was personally liable:
"Nothing on the face of the notes indicated Hoynes' status as agent
of the corporation. To the contrary, each signed as individual
maker."7
In denying parol evidence against the payee, the court in Col-
onial Film ignored the language of subsection 3-403(2)(b), which
allows parol evidence between immediate parties. The court also
relied on de Golian2 despite the dissimilarity in situations.
In de Golian the corporate name appeared on the left side of the
note in an address block and differed from the name of the alleged
corporate principal. Based on these facts, the court in de Golian
decided that the corporation was not named and that parol evidence
was thus inadmissible under subsection 3-403(2)(a)." If the corpora-
tion had been named, however, the de Golian court implied that it
would have permitted parol evidence under subsection 3-403(2)(b). 4
In Colonial Film, the corporate name appeared in the signature
block immediately above the defendant's signature. Therefore, the
corporation was named, and the court should have allowed parol
evidence under subsection 3-403(2)(b).
The Colonial Film court also erred in relying on the language of
joint liability. Language such as "[wje promise to pay" is often pre-
printed on standard promissory notes, a fact which courts should
"148 Ga. App. 632, 252 S.E.2d 61 (1979).
7Id. at 632, 252 S.E.2d at 62.
7A/d.
"Id (applying Southern Oxygen Supply Co. v. De Golian, 230 Ga. 405, 197 S.E.2d
374 (1973)). See notes 45-52 supra and accompanying text.
230 Ga. at 405-06, 197 S.E.2d at 375.
7
,Id.
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consider before deciding that this language denotes personal or joint
liability. As the Stringer and Eisen courts held, parol evidence
should be admitted under subsection 3-403(2)(b) despite language im-
plying joint liability."5
Corporate officers are entitled to present parol evidence to
avoid personal liability in an action by the payee if the instrument
names the corporation. Using language of joint liability in the note
should not preclude the admission of parol evidence.
2. Parol Evidence to Establish Personal Liability.-Parol
evidence can be used not only to avoid personal liability, but also to
establish personal liability of corporate officers. In Johnson v.
Sams,"6 the note provided that Queensmarble, Inc., promised to pay
on demand to the order of the named payees who were plaintiffs in the
case. "Queensmarble, Inc." appeared on the first signature line,
followed in order by the signatures of the individual defendants:
Edward J. O'Donnell, Kent A. Larson and Byron W. Sams. In the
trial court, plaintiffs obtained a jury verdict assessing personal liabili-
ty against the individual defendants. Because the note provided that
"Queensmarble, Inc. promises to pay," the individual defendants
argued on appeal that the plaintiffs were estopped to establish per-
sonal liability against them. At the time of the signing of the note,
however, the corporation was not in existence, and the defendants
were doing business as partners. Affirming the judgment of the trial
court, the Supreme Court of Minnesota upheld the admission of parol
evidence showing that the individual signers were personally liable on
the note.77
In Citibank Eastern, N.A. v. Minbiole,8 the court relied on parol
evidence in establishing personal liability of the corporate officer.
The name of the corporation appeared on the face of the note.
Although the note had a space for a signature as a representative of
the corporation, defendant signed without indicating his office in a
blank designated "Co-Maker." The method of signing the note may
have been sufficient to find personal liability, but the court also
relied on a "Co-Maker's/Guarantor's Statement" signed by defendant
"which clearly states that he is personally liable on the note."79
3. Burden of Proof.-A corporate officer is presumed
personally liable on a negotiable instrument when he names the cor-
poration, but fails to indicate his or her representative capacity."
75Rosedale State Bank & Trust Co. v. Stringer, 2 Kan. App. 2d 331, 579 P.2d 158
(1978); Wood Press, Inc. v. Eisen, 157 N.J. Super. 57, 384 A.2d 538 (1978).
296 Minn. 112, 206 N.W.2d 925 (1973).
"Id. at 115, 206 N.W.2d at 927.
750 A.D.2d 1052, 377 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1975).
7'377 N.Y.S.2d at 729-30.
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The corporate officer has the burden of proof to overcome
this presumption by affirmatively demonstrating that the "taker of
the note knew or understood that the signer intended to execute the
instrument in a representative status only."'"
The New York Court of Appeals in Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v.
Ceppos" discussed what a defendant must do to avoid summary
judgment. "Kenbert Lighting Ind. Inc." had been handwritten on the
first signature line of the promissory notes, followed by the
signature "Kenneth Ceppos" in what appeared to be different hand-
writing without any indication of representative capacity. In a blank
space for the insertion of a pronoun, the word "we" had been writ-
ten so that the notes read "we promise." In response to the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Ceppos filed an affidavit
stating that he had intended to sign only as a representative of the
corporation. The Ceppos court ruled that the defendant's affidavit,
merely stating an undisclosed intent to sign as a representative, was
insufficient to withstand summary judgment." The corporate officer
has the burden of establishing "an agreement, understanding or
course of dealing" that the officer had signed only as a represen-
tative of the corporation.' To avoid summary judgment, a defendant
must show facts "creat[ing] a triable issue on whether [the plaintiff]
knew or should have known that it was [the defendant's] intention to
sign the notes in a representative capacity only."' 5 Ceppos' affidavit
could have stated, for example, the identity of the agent who had
represented the plaintiff in accepting the notes and the disclosure of
Ceppos' intent to sign only as a representative of the corporation.
Similarly in Seale v. Nichols," uncommunicated intent to sign
only as a representative of the corporation was insufficient to avoid
personal liability. "The Fashion Beauty Salon" appeared on the first
signature line of the promissory note. The name "Carl V. Nichols"
had been typed on the second signature line, followed by the
signature "Carl V. Nichols." On appeal from a summary judgment
against Nichols in favor of the payee Seale, the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed because Nichols had failed to state in his affidavit
that he had disclosed his status as president of the corporation to
"Rosedale State Bank & Trust Co. v. Stringer, 2 Kan. App. 2d 331 579 P.2d 158
(1978).
"Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v. Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 230, 385 N.E.2d 1068, 1071, 413
N.Y.S.2d 141, 144 (1978).
8246 N.Y.2d 223, 385 N.E.2d 1068, 413 N.Y.S.2d 141 (1978).
"Id. at 231, 385 N.E.2d at 1072, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
"Md. at 230, 385 N.E.2d at 1071, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 144.
"Md.
8505 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1974).
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Seale. 7 The court ruled that a corporate officer's affidavit should
contain facts supporting representative capacity such as: an agree-
ment that the officer signed only as a representative of the corpora-
tion; a prior course of dealing indicating that the payee had accepted
the officer's signature as a representative of the corporation; or a
disclosure of representative capacity to, and the acceptance of the
note by, the payee."s
The Supreme Court of Arkansas in Fanning v. Hembree Oil Co.89
considered the sufficiency of evidence necessary to support a verdict
against a corporate officer who had signed a note containing the cor-
porate name with no evidence of representative capacity. Roy Hem-
bree, an officer of plaintiff payee, testified that he had demanded a
personal note as a condition of doing further business with Razor-
back Asphalt Co. Under Hembree's version of the facts, Fanning had
protested signing personally, but had signed the note stating "I will
see to it that you get your money." Fanning, the defendant, testified
that he had agreed to sign only as an officer of Razorback Asphalt
Co. and had refused to undertake personal liability. The defendant's
statements were corroborated by the testimony of two witnesses,
Fanning's secretary and another officer of the corporation who had
also signed the note. Ruling that substantial evidence supported the
judgment, the court affirmed the trial court" and noted the follow-
ing "significant circumstances: [a] note which bound only Razorback
would have been of little value considering its financial condition;
after the note was signed, Hembree extended substantial credit to
Razorback; Hembree had little education and was not a good
reader;"'" Hembree did not know that the corporate name had been
typed on the note by Fanning's secretary, and Fanning's secretary
could have typed on the note Fanning's status as secretary of the
corporation.
The sufficiency of evidence to avoid personal liability may be
tested by a lower standard when corporate checks rather than pro-
missory notes are involved. The Ceppos and Seale courts held that
an affidavit showing only undisclosed intent to sign a promissory
note as a representative failed to rebut the presumption of personal
liability and to withstand summary judgment. 2 The Florida District
Court of Appeals in Speer v. Friedland," held that the defendant's
"7Id. at 255.
"Mid. at 254-55.
245 Ark. 825, 434 S.W.2d 822 (1968).
"Id at 829, 434 S.W.2d at 824.
1Id.
"Rotuba Extruders, Inc. v. Ceppos, 46 N.Y.2d 223, 385 N.E.2d 1068, 413 N.Y.S.2d
141 (1978); Seale v. Nichols, 505 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. 1974).
"276 So. 2d 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
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testimony of her intent to sign a corporate check as a representative
rebutted the presumption of personal liability and shifted the
burden of proof to the plaintiff payee." The signature block on the
check in Speer appeared as follows:
JIMMY SPEERS AUTO AUCTION
Bruce A. Ryals
Ann Marie Speer 5
The signature "Ann Marie Speer" had been made with a check
writing machine. The defendant Speer testified that she had signed
the check as treasurer of the corporation. Reversing the lower
court's judgment against Speer, the appellate court stated:
Appellant testified that she never intended to sign the check
in question in an individual capacity, but that she signed it
in her representative capacity, which she had authority to
do. Appellee produced no evidence to controvert this
testimony. The presumption that she signed in a personal
capacity was overcome by the manifest weight of the
evidence. The burden then shifted to appellee to prove the
issue by a preponderance of the evidence, unaided by the
presumption, which he failed to do.9
The court in Speer distinguished between corporate checks and
promissory notes in formulating a lenient procedure for overcoming
the presumption of personal liability on a corporate check. Although
corporate checks may justify a lesser standard of evidence than pro-
missory notes, the Speer standard may be too minimal because it
emasculates the presumption of personal liability. By simply stating
that no personal liability was intended, the defendant too easily
shifts the burden of proving personal liability to the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court of Texas in Griffin v. Ellinger97 acknowl-
edged a difference between checks and notes:
We recognize that it is unusual to demand the individual
obligation of a corporate officer on checks drawn on the cor-
porate account, and that the more usual way of obtaining the
personal obligation of an officer on such a check would be by
endorsement. Business practice and usage are proper factors
to be considered in construing the particular instrument
under consideration.98
9 Itl at 86.
"Id. at 85.
"MId at 86.
'"538 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. 1976).
"d. at 99.
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Despite this statement, the Griffin court failed to lower the stan-
dard of proof in a corporate check situation from that in a pro-
missory note situation.
The defendant in Griffin had signed checks imprinted with the
corporate name without indicating his representative capacity and
had given these checks for labor and material furnished by plaintiff
Ellinger to the corporation for a construction project. Griffin argued
that the check as a whole showed he was not personally liable. He
pointed out that a corporation can act only by an agent and that a
personal signature is always required on a corporate check. Despite
the business practice of seldom requiring personal liability on a cor-
porate check and the usual business practice of indicating personal
liability on the check by indorsement when personal liability is re-
quired, the court ruled that Griffin's signatures on corporate checks
drawn on a corporate account were not enough to show represen-
tative capacity.9 The burden is on the corporate officer to disclose
representative capacity."'
Parol evidence, however, is admissible to determine whether
Griffin disclosed his representative capacity. "Ellinger was never
told who owned the ...project, who would pay him, or who would
be responsible for the payments, nor did he inquire." Griffin had
signed and delivered the checks without mentioning whether he was
assuming personal liability on the checks. The Supreme Court of
Texas also stated that "prior dealings between the parties are rele-
vant in determining whether the parties understood the signature to
be in a representative capacity.""1 ° Ellinger had previously accepted
other checks from the corporation and had not sought the liability of
the corporate officers who had signed them. Moreover, Ellinger had
submitted bills for the project directly to the corporation. Ellinger
testified that he had relied on the personal liability of Griffin, rather
than the liability of the corporation. Despite an abundance of
evidence favoring Griffin, the supreme court affirmed the trial
court's judgment for Ellinger supported solely by Ellinger's own
testimony."
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Commonwealth
Bank & Trust Co. v. Plotkin,' upheld summary judgment against a
defendant who had indorsed a check which was later dishonored.
The check was payable to Plotkin and contained a stamped indorse-
ment "Creative Travel, Inc. for desposit only in 5-250" followed by
"Id. at 99-100.
'Id. at 100.
10Id.
"'Id. at 101.
'03371 Mass. 218, 355 N.E.2d 917 (1976).
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the signature "Arthur Plotkin." Plotkin was the president and
treasurer of Creative Travel, Inc. The check had been given to the
corporation as a substitue for a check previously dishonored.
Plotkin's affidavit stated that the bank had previously credited the
corporation's account with similar checks. Plotkin further stated
that a vice president of the bank "well knew" that the check was a
substitute for a previously dishonored check and that its proceeds
belonged to the corporation. The trial court entered summary judg-
ment against Plotkin in favor of the bank." 4 Upholding the summary
judgment, the Supreme Judical Court of Massachusetts ruled that
Plotkin's affidavit was insufficient to show that the bank had agreed
to take the check without Plotkin's personal indorsement."'1
The affidavit in Plotkin, however, should have been sufficient to
withstand summary judgment. Plotkin alleged a prior course of deal-
ing indicating that the bank had understood his intention to act only
in a representative capacity; thus, he created a triable issue of fact.
In determining the agreement between the parties, the Plotkin
court should have considered this prior course of dealing between
the parties.
Placing the burden of disproving personal liability on the cor-
porate officer is warranted because the corporate officer can easily
avoid personal liability on an instrument by showing his or her cor-
porate title with his or her signature."' The corporate officer who
fails to take this simple step is justifiably required to prove that
personal liability was not intended by the parties. The burden of proof,
however, should be less stringent for the corporate officer who signs
a corporate check than for the officer who signs a corporate note."7
Payees of corporate checks rarely insist that the corporate signer
assume personal liability.0 8 When personal liability is required on a
corporate check, the usual business practice is to indicate the per-
sonal liability by indorsement."9 Professors White and Summers
have argued for the lenient evaluation of parol evidence in corporate
check situations:
The payee of a corporate check with the corporate name im-
printed on its face probably expects less from the individual
drawer than the payee of a corporate note may, where both
the corporate name and the maker's name may be either
handwritten or typewritten. Further, it is common for
' Id, at 219, 355 N.E.2d at 918.
'"Mfd. at 221-22, 355 N.E.2d at 919.
'"See U.C.C. § 3-403(3).
1
.WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 56, § 13-4 at 495.
'"Griffin v. Ellinger, 538 S.W.2d at 99.1091&
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creditors to demand the individual promise of officers on cor-
porate promissory notes, specially in the case of small cor-
porations. Thus, we think a court should be more reluctant
to fine [sic] an agent personally liable who has signed a cor-
porate check than in the case of a similar indorsement of a
corporate note. . . .[W]e hope that courts will be more con-
cious of the differences in business practices with respect to
different types of instruments when they evaluate the ex-
trinsic evidence presented by the parties. °
B. Liability to Transferees
Although parol evidence between immediate parties is allowed,
subsection 3-403(2)(b) generally precludes a corporate officer from
using parol evidence to avoid personal liability when an instrument
showing corporate name but not representative capacity is trans-
ferred to a third party.
The rule was applied to impose personal liability on the
individual maker of a corporate promissory note in O.P. Ganjo, Inc.
v. Tri-Urban Realty Co."' "Tri-Urban Realty Co., Inc." appeared on
the first signature line of the note. On the second signature line was
the signature "George Moskowitz." In addition, the note read "I pro-
mise to pay." The Superior Court of New Jersey held Moskowitz
personally obligated to the transferee of the note as a matter of law
because the note failed to show that his signature had been made as
president of the corporation.'
Likewise the individual drawer of two corporate checks was
held personally liable in Financial Associates v. Impact Marketing,
Inc."' In that case a holder in due course brought an action to
recover on two checks imprinted with the words "Impact Marketing,
Inc." The checks had been signed "Marc Eliot" without any indica-
tion of a corporate office. Eliot claimed that he had drawn the
checks within his authority as a corporate officer to pay for legal
services provided to the corporation. Relying on subsection
3-403(2)(b), the New York City Civil Court refused to permit parol
evidence to avoid personal liability and granted a motion for summary
judgment against the defendant." ' The court explained: "[Slection
[3-403(2)(b)] is clear. It prevents a drawer or maker, who fails to indicate
"*°WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 56, § 13-4 at 495.
1'108 N.J. Super. 517, 261 A.2d 722 (1969). Accord, Abby Fin. Corp. v. S.R.S. Se-
cond Ave. Theatre Corp., 11 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1011 (N.Y. App. Div. 1972).
11108 N.J. Super. at 524, 261 A.2d at 725.
" 90 Misc. 2d 545, 394 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Civ. Ct. 1977).
1'1394 N.Y.S.2d at 815-16.
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his representative capacity on an instrument, to contest the question of
his individual liability against a holder in due course.' 15
Although a corporate officer may easily avoid personal liability
by showing his or her representative capacity, a blanket prohibition
against parol evidence in actions brought by transferees under
subsection 3-403(2)(b) seems unreasonable. Parol evidence should be
admissible against transferees as well as immediate parties for
several reasons. First, a corporation can act only through its agents,
and transferees expect the signatures of corporate officers on cor-
porate notes and checks. Thus, an instrument showing a corporate
name and individual signatures without representative capacity is
ambiguous on its face and puts a transferee on notice of a possible
lack of personal liability. Second, when a corporate promissory note
or check is transferred by indorsement, the transferee generally
relies on the financial condition of the transferor-indorser rather
than the corporate maker or drawer and will seek to hold the
transferor-indorser liable if the instrument is dishonored when
presented to the corporation for payment. In the rare situations in
which a transferee refuses to take an instrument without the per-
sonal liability of a corporate officer, requiring the transferee to in-
sist that the instrument clearly show the personal liability of the
corporate officer is not an unreasonable burden. Third, corporate
officers, particularly those of small corporations not represented by
retained counsel, are usually unaware that failing to show their cor-
porate offices will result in personal liablity. The number of reported
opinions involving instruments signed by corporate officers who fail-
ed to show their offices support this contention.
Prior to the U.C.C., some jurisdictions permitted parol evidence
against transferees based on the above reasoning. Norman v.
Beling" ' illustrates this liberal pre-Code approach. The corporate
name "Teal Corporation" had been typewritten on the first
signature line of each note. The signature "J. Harold Semar" ap-
peared on the second signature line followed by the signature
"Christopher A. Beling" on the third signature line. Semar was the
president and Beling was the treasurer of the Teal Corporation. The
pronoun "we" had been inserted in each note so that it read "we
promise to pay." In an action against Beling to recover on the notes,
it was conceded that the plaintiff transferee had been unaware of
the representative status of Semar and Beling. Plaintiff rested after
introducing the notes into evidence. Beling offered evidence that he
had signed only as a corporate officer in compliance with the by-
laws of the corporation.
111394 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
"'33 N.J. 237. 163 A.2d 129 (1960).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that "[clorporations must
act by means of agents, . . .and it is common to expect that a cor-
porate name placed upon a negotiable instrument in order to bind
the corporation as maker ... will be accompanied on the instrument
by the signature of the person or persons authorized by the by-laws
to sign such instrument.. 1 7 The court held that the signatures under
the circumstances created an ambiguity justifying the admission of
parol evidence to establish whether the individual signers had
undertaken personal liability."8 The Beling court reasoned:
[W]e do not believe that the use of extrinsic evidence to
clarify an ambiguity present on the face of the note should
be forbidden because the person suing on the notes is an
endorsee of the payee and was not a party to and is without
knowledge of the circumstances under which the notes were
delivered, in short, a holder in due course for all purposes
except that the face of the note contains an ambiguity. When
a defect by way of ambiguity is suggested by the face of the
instrument the purchaser is put on inquiry because to per-
mit the purchaser to ignore such a warning with impunity
has no sound basis."9
After enactment of the U.C.C., the Pennsylvania Superior Court
allowed parol evidence against transferees in Pollin v. Mindy Mfg.
Co. '2 The defendant Apfelbaum had signed checks without in-
dicating his corporate office. The name of the company had been
printed at the top of each check and again immediately above the
signature of Apfelbaum. Apfelbaum avoided personal liability
although the plaintiffs were indorsees of the checks rather than
immediate parties to the original transaction. The Pennsylvania
Superior Court noted that a corporation can act only through its
agents; thus one normally expects the signature of an agent on a
corporate instrument. The court considered each check as a whole to
determine whether Apfelbaum had signed as a representative of the
corporation. 2' The checks had been drawn on a specific payroll ac-
count of the corporation and consequently could not have been
drawn on Apfelbaum's personal account. Finding that each check
revealed representative capacity, the court held that Apfelbaum was
17Id at 243, 163 A.2d at 132.
..Id. at 244, 163 A.2d at 134.
"'Id. at 245-46, 163 A.2d at 133.
211 Pa. Super. Ct. 87, 236 A.2d 542 (1967), followed in Bennett v. McCann, 125
Ga. App. 393, 188 S.E.2d 165 (1972).
1 211 Pa. Super. Ct. at 93, 236 A.2d at 545.
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not personally liable.' Professors White and Summers have lauded
"the Pollin court's emphasis on business expectations ... [as] proper
and entirely consistent with the spirit of 3-403.""'
Unless the instrument clearly shows that the corporate officer
signed in his or her individual capacity, courts should view an in-
strument naming the corporation as ambiguous. Parol evidence
should be permitted against transferees as well as immediate par-
ties to determine whether the corporate officer had signed only as a
representative of the corporation. For reasons identical to those in
actions by immediate parties, the corporate officer, in actions by
transferees, should bear the burden of proof that the parties did not
intend personal liability, but this burden should be lighter in cor-
porate check situations than in promissory note situations."4
V. BOTH CORPORATE NAME AND
REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY SHOWN
When the corporate name precedes or follows the name and of-
fice of the corporate officer, the instrument ususally binds only the
corporation under subsection 3-403(3). An exception to subsection
3-403(3) permits parol evidence to establish the personal liability of
the signing officer in addition to corporate liability."' Courts usually
admit parol evidence under this subsection only if the instrument is
ambiguous."'
A. Unambiguous Instruments
The decisions in Karr v. Baumann"' and Phoenix Air Condition-
ing Co. v. Pound"8 illustrate unambiguous instruments justifying the
preclusion of parol evidence. In Karr, the signature "Robert Bauman
[sic] Pres." appeared on the first signature line, followed by "Central
Coffee Shoppe Inc." on the second signature line. The form of the
signature conclusively indicated corporate liability; consequently,
the New York Supreme Court denied evidence of a personal obliga-
tion and held only the corporation liable on the instrument."
122Id
... WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 56, § 13-4 at 494-95.
'
2 See notes 106-10 supra and accompanying text.
'
2
'See, e.g., Trenton Trust Co. v. Klausman, 222 Pa. Super. Ct. 400, 296 A.2d 275
(1972).
"'See Havatampa Corp. v. Walton Drug Co., 354 So. 2d 1235, 1237 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1978).
1213 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
8123 Ga. App. 523, 181 S.E.2d 719 (1971).
'113 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 181.
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Similarly, the Georgia Court of Appeals easily determined the
issue of personal liability in Pound. The note was signed: "by E.C.
Pound, Jr. President (seal) A.R. Kivette Secy. (seal)." Typed across
the top of the note was the following: "This note constitutes pay-
ment in full of all sums due by Summit Productions, Inc. to Phoenix
Conditioning Co., Inc."'3 ° The payee obtained a verdict against the
corporate officers, but the trial judge granted the officers' motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict."' Affirming the judg-
ment, the appellate court observed that the note named the prin-
cipal and had been signed in the officers' representative capacities.'32
The court decided that the note unambiguously represented a cor-
porate obligation and thus refused to permit parol evidence to
establish personal liability of the corporate officers.' 3
B. Ambiguous Instruments
As illustrated by Havatampa Corp. v. Walton Drug Co., 3' an am-
biguity may exist despite the presence of both the corporate name
and representative capacity on the face of the instrument. The
signature block of the note in Havatampa appeared as follows:
Walton Drug Co., Inc. d/b/a/ Touchton Drugs
and/or (Seal)x
Bob Edrington, Owner
(Seal)x"'3
The defendant Edrington had signed "Bob Edrington, President" on
the second signature line. The trial court dismissed the action
against Edrington although the plaintiff Havatampa Corporation of-
fered parol evidence that it had demanded Edrington's personal
liability when Edrington signed the note. The Florida District Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to permit parol
evidence after finding a lack of "logical reference" between the cor-
porate and individual signatures.' 6 The court reasoned that the
defendant officer would have been subjected to personal liability if
the corporation had not been named and saw "no reason to vary this
result merely because the name of the principal appears somewhere
on the note but appears to have no intended effect upon the agent's
signature which, standing alone, would subject the agent to personal
"'°123 Ga. App. at 523, 181 S.E.2d at 719.
"'Id at 524, 181 S.E.2d at 720.
182Id,
"'354 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
" Id at 1236.
'"Id. at 1238.
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liability."'37 In addition, the court noted that the following factors
supported a finding of ambiguity warranting parol evidence: the in-
sertion of the word "we" to read "we promise to pay;" the words
"and/or" preceding Edrington's signature; and the discrepancy be-
tween the handwritten word "President" and the typewritten word
"Owner."'3
According to the Havatampa opinion, the formula for corporate
officers seeking to avoid personal liability requires:
1) that the represented organization be named; 2) that the
agent sign his name and office; and 3) that the name of the
principal and signature and office of the agent be in
reference to each other so that reasonable men dealing with
the instrument would understand from the face of the note
that the agent's signature was in a representative capacity
only, and not in an individual capacity. ... 139
The defendant in Havatampa failed to indicate clearly only cor-
porate liability. Signing his name on the second signature line was
ambiguous in light of the other evidence of ambiguity, and the court
correctly permitted parol evidence to explain the ambiguity.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Trenton Trust Co. v.
Klausman"'4 also allowed parol evidence to clarify an ambiguous in-
strument. The face of the note in Klausman had been signed:
The Shoe Rack
X Mark Klausman, Sec.
X Lionel Klausman, Vice Pres.
X Michael Klausman, Pres.'
The back of the note appeared as follows:
X Mark Klausman, Sec.
X Lionel Klausman, Vice Pres.
X Michael Klausman, Pres.
The Shoe Rack
X Mark Klausman, Sec.
The corporation was clearly liable on the note; therefore, the court
discussed only whether the officers had added their personal
liability by their indorsements: "The narrow issue presented to our
Court is whether it was so clear as a matter of law that the
137j&
'Id. at 1236.
39Id. at 1237.
4222 Pa. Super. Ct. 400, 403-05, 296 A.2d 275, 278 (1972).
.'Id. at 405, 296 A.2d at 278 (dissenting opinion).
14id.
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endorsements were given in a representative capacity that the
appellant [payee] was correctly precluded from introducing evidence
to the contrary." ' The court considered, in addition to the language
of the instrument, "the position, style and arrangement of the whole
writing" '' and decided that the note failed to explain why the
corporate officers had signed in their representative capacity as
both makers and indorsers or why the indorsement of Mark
Klausman appeared twice. '45 The Klausman court correctly permit-
ted the admission of parol evidence to explain the ambiguity.'46
Parol evidence was improperly refused by the Georgia Court of
Appeals in First National Bank v. C. & S. Concrete Structures
Inc.," 7 The note had been signed "C. & S. Concrete Structures, Inc. by
Vernon Crutcher, President, and G.E. Strickland, Secretary and
Treasurer." The back of the note contained "under the portion
entitled name 'C. & S. Concrete Structures, Inc.' and then followed
under appropriate columns information with regard to the loan, such
as interest, due date and amount; then under this information were
the signatures 'Vernon Crutcher, President,' and 'G.E. Strickland,
Secretary and Treasurer.' "4' The payee argued that lack of
continuity between the corporate name and the officers' signatures,
and that signatures indicating corporate liability on both the front
and back of the note created an ambiguity justifying parol evidence.
The majority refused to permit parol evidence, holding that there
was no ambiguity in the indorsements which had been made in com-
pliance with subsection 3-403(3).'
The dissent in C. & S. Concrete would have permitted parol
evidence to explain the ambiguity because signing as both maker and
indorser is either a "nullity or an absurdity."'5 0 The dissent is correct
because the instrument contained ambiguous signatures which could
have been interpreted in two ways: as representing joint liability of
the corporation and the individuals or as representing only corporate
liability as both maker and indorser. Parol evidence could properly
have been admitted under subsection 3-403(3); the language "[e]xcept
as otherwise established" allows parol evidence to explain am-
biguities.
Parol evidence should be denied under subsection 3-403(3) if the
instrument unambiguously shows that the parties intended only
'"Id at 402, 296 A.2d at 276.
11d.
"'Id. at 402-03, 296 A.2d at 276-77.
"'Id. at 405, 296 A.2d at 277.
"128 Ga. App. 330, 196 S.E.2d 473 (1973).
1481d.
"Id. at 331-32, 196 S.E.2d at 474.
'"'Id. at 333, 196 S.E.2d at 474 (Pannell, J., dissenting).
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corporate liability. When an ambiguity exists, however, courts
should permit parol evidence to determine the true intentions o the
parties. The opinions have not considered the burden of proof issue
when parol evidence is admitted under subsection 3-403(3), but that
subsection appears to create a presumption in favor of corporate
officers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 3-403 of the U.C.C. provides a set of rules for
determining whether corporate officers are liable on corporate
negotiable instruments. Subsection 3-403(2)(a) prohibits parol
evidence when the corporate officer neither names the corporation
nor shows representative capacity. Courts should not strictly follow
this rule in actions between immediate parties. Under some
circumstances, parol evidence should be permitted, but the cor-
porate officer seeking to avoid personal liability should bear the
burden of proof.
Subsection 3-403(2)(b) permits parol evidence against immediate
parties but not against transferees when the instrument names the
corporation without indicating representative capacity. Parol
evidence should be admissible against transferees as well as im-
mediate parties, however, because the instrument is ambiguous, put-
ting transferees on notice of a possible lack of personal liability. The
cases place the burden of proof on the officer to establish an agree-
ment, understanding, or course of dealing that the officer was not to
be personally liable. Placing this burden on the corporate officer is
appropriate, but the burden should be less stringent for corporate
checks than for corporate notes.
A corporate officer generally will not be personally liable under
subsection 3-403(3) when the instrument shows both the name of the
corporation and the title of the officer. When the instrument is am-
biguous, however, courts permit parol evidence to establish that the
parties intended personal liability of the corporate officer. Where
the burden of proof is to be placed under this subsection is unclear.
The Code is biased toward holding the corporate officer per-
sonally liable. Subsection 3-403(2)(a) forbids the admission of parol
evidence to deny personal liability when neither the corporation nor
representative capacity is shown. Subsection 3-403(3), however,
allows parol evidence to establish personal liability although both
the corporation and representative capacity are shown. A corporate
officer who wants to guarantee that he or she incurs no personal
liability from signing negotiable instruments for the corporation
should take the following steps: insure that the corporate name ap-
pears immediately above his or her signature; place the word "by"
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in front of his or her signature; and show his or her corporate title
immediately after his or her signature.15 A lender who desires to in-
sure the personal liability of corporate officers in a lending transac-
tion should require the corporate officer to sign twice. The first
signing should designate the corporate office; the second signing
should show the word "individually" after the signature."'2
When it is possible to advise corporate officers prior to execu-
tion of a negotiable instrument, potential problems can be avoided.
The signing of a corporate negotiable instrument without legal
advice, however, can be hazardous to the economic health of the cor-
porate officer.
5 See U.C.C. § 3-403, Comment 3.
'See Gramatan Co. v. MBM, Inc., 5 U.C.C. REP. SERV. (N.Y. App. Div. 1968):
Abercia v. First Nat'l Bank, 500 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973).
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